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Abstract
We provide several characterizations of unanimity decision rules, in a public choice
model where preferences are constrained by attributes possessed by the alternatives
(Nehring and Puppe, 2007a,b). Solidarity conditions require that when some para-
meters of the economy change, the agents whose parameters are kept xed either all
weakly lose or they all weakly win. Population-monotonicity (Thomson, 1983a,b) ap-
plies to the arrival and departure of agents, while replacement-domination (Moulin,
1987) applies to changes in preferences. We show that either solidarity property is
compatible with voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness if and only if the attribute
space is quasi-median (Nehring, 2004), and with Pareto-e¢ ciency if and only if the
attribute space is a tree. Each of these combinations characterizes unanimity.
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1 Introduction
Unanimity decision rules are used in many political institutions, such as the United Na-
tions Security Council, the ratication procedure for treaties in the European Union, and
criminal law juries. Surprisingly few justications for such rules are available (Berga,
Bergantiños, Massó and Neme, 2004; Ju, 2005). We provide several characterizations of
unanimity in a general public choice problem. Decision rules prescribe an outcome as a
function of the preferences submitted by individuals. The set of admissible preferences is
constrained by a set of objective attributes possessed by the alternatives: we consider the
class of attribute-based domains, introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2007a, 2007b, 2005,
2010). Solidarity conditions are the key element in all of our characterizations.
Solidarity is a principle of justice with respect to changes in circumstances. It says
that all agents not responsible for these changes should be a¤ected in the same direction.
Possible changes include the arrival or departure of individuals, as well as changes in their
preferences. Replacement-domination is introduced by Moulin (1987) in the context
of quasi-linear binary public decision. It applies to a model with a xed population of
agents and requires that the replacement of the preferences of one agent causes the other
agents to either all weakly win or all weakly lose. Population-monotonicityis introduced
by Thomson (1983a, 1983b) in the context of bargaining. It applies to a model with a
variable population of agents and requires that when one agent joins the population, the
other agents whose preferences are kept xed either all weakly win or they all weakly lose.1
In the context of public choice, solidarity conditions are rst studied in location models.
Thomson (1993) considers a continuous line over which agents have single-peaked prefer-
ences. For any preference prole, a target rule selects the Pareto-e¢ cient alternative that
is closest to some exogenously xed alternative on the line. Thomson (1993) shows that
the target rules are the only Pareto-e¢ cient rules that satisfy replacement-domination.
1For surveys on these two conditions, see Thomson (1995, 1999).
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Ching and Thomson (1997) show that these rules are also the only Pareto-e¢ cient rules
that satisfy population-monotonicity. Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra (1999) and Klaus
(1999, 2001) extend these results for single-peaked preferences on a tree network. Klaus
(1999, 2001) further shows that the target rules are the only ones that satisfy unanimity
(if all agentspreferred alternative is the same, it should be selected), strategy-proofness
(reporting true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents) and either con-
dition of solidarity, on a tree network. Finally Klaus (1999, 2001) extends this second
result to Euclidean spaces, when agentspreferences are separable across dimensions and
quadratic, and characterizes coordinatewise target rules on this domain. Gordon (2007b)
obtains an impossibility result for single-peaked preferences on a circle, except on small
discrete domains (less than ve alternatives) of symmetric preferences.2
In this paper, we extend the analysis to a larger class of models in which the set
of admissible preferences is constrained by a set of objective attributes possessed by the
alternatives. This class of domains generalizes discrete versions of all of the locations models
listed in the last paragraph. One di¤erence is that these models assume a continuum of
alternatives, while we assume a discrete set. This di¤erence is however not fundamental.
The real novelty of our work is that the class of attribute-based domains is larger than
the class of domains structured around a location model. For example, the unrestricted
domain, the domain of separable preferences over sets of objects (Barberà, Sonnenschein
and Zhou 1991) and models of voting under constraints (Barberà, Massó and Neme, 1997
and 2005) can be viewed as attribute-based domains.
Our starting point, in section 3, is a characterization by Nehring and Puppe (2007b),
which mirrors results by Barberà, Massó and Neme (1997, 2005) in the closely related model
of voting under constraints These authors show that the rules that satisfy voter-sovereignty
(any alternative is selected for some prole) and strategy-proofness in any attribute-based
domain form a class of voting by issues rules which make separate decisions between
2Solidarity conditions were also studied in the problem of locating multiple public goods by Miyagawa
(1998, 2001), Ehlers (2002, 2003), and Umezawa (2012) and in the problem of selecting a probabilitic
location by Ehlers and Klaus (2001). These models di¤er from ours in that they include some alternatives
which are not considered best by any preference in the domain.
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each attribute and its complement.
In section 4, we show that in any attribute-based domain, the rules satisfying voter-
sovereignty, strategy-proofness and solidarity, when they exist, are unanimity rules, in
which each of the attributes of some prespecied targetalternative can only be defeated
by an unanimous vote. This result can be viewed as a generalization of a discrete counter-
part of the similar characterizations by Klaus (1999, 2001) on trees and Euclidean spaces.
Nehring and Puppe (2007b) have characterized the class of attribute spaces in which una-
nimity voting by issues rules exist, the quasi-median spaces (Nehring 2004). It follows
that the quasi-median domains are exactly the ones where these three conditions are com-
patible. We provide examples to illustrate how this class of domains extends the discrete
counterparts of the domains studied by Klaus (1999, 2001).
In section 5, we study the compatibility of Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity in attribute-
based domains. Here, we do not assume strategy-proofness and hence cannot restrict
attention to voting by issuesrules from the outset, but this last condition turns out to
be implied by the other two.3 Unfortunately, our result is negative. Trees, which are pre-
cisely the discrete counterpart of the domains studied by Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra
(1999) and Klaus (1999, 2001) in continuous location models are the only attribute-based
domains where the two conditions are compatible. Finally, we provide a characterization
on discrete trees, that mirrors the results obtained by these authors in the continuum case.
Our proof di¤ers from theirs, in that we rely on the theory of voting by issues.
2 The model
In this section, we present the class of attribute-based domains (Nehring and Puppe
2007a,b). Then we present the xed and variable population models and the conditions we
are interested in.
Let A be a nonempty nite set of alternatives. Let H  2A be a non-empty family of
3 In a companion paper, Gordon (2007a) studies Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity in a general public choice
problem and establishes several of these conditionsgeneral implications. We defer the discussion of the
relation between the two papers to the end of section 5.
4
subsets of A, with typical element H  A: The elements of H are called attributes. We
can think of each of them as a descriptive characteristic relevant for the choice and dened
by the set of alternatives that possess it. For example, if the set A is a set of possible
constitutions for a nation, the attributes could be federal, non-federal, presidential,
parliamentaryand the attribute presidential is dened as the subset of constitutions
in A that are presidential. Suppose that H satises the following three conditions. Non-
triviality: for all H 2 H, H 6= ;: Closedness under negation: for all H 2 H, Hc 2 H.
Separation: for all x 6= y 2 A; there is H 2 H such that x 2 H and y =2 H. A family H
that satises these three conditions is called an attribute space.4 Following Nehring (1999),
an attribute space enables us to dene a notion of betweenness of alternatives as follows.
Let a; b; c 2 A: We say that b is between a and c, denoted by b 2 [a; c] if b possesses all
attributes that are common to a and c: For all a; b; c 2 A;
b 2 [a; c] :, for all H 2 H, fa; cg  H ) b 2 H:
Here are some simple examples. It is important to realize that an attribute space could be
much more intricate than the ones shown here.
Example 1 (Lines and Trees) Suppose that the alternatives can be ordered from left
to right by some linear ordering  on X: The family H of all sets of the form Hx :=
fa 2 A : a  xg or Hx := fa 2 A : a  xg for all x 2 A dene an attribute space. Each at-
tribute is thus of the form greater than or equal to xor lesser than or equal to x": The in-
duced line betweenness is given, for all a; b; c 2 A; by b 2 [a; c] :, [a  b  c or c  b  a] :
More generally, an attribute space can be dened on a tree, dened as a graph (set of
undirected edges) on A without cycles. For each x 2 A; the set A n fxg can be uniquely
represented as the union of two connected components H+x and H
 
x whose intersection is
the singleton fxg : The family H of all sets of the form H+x and H x for all x 2 A dene
an attribute space.
Example 2 (The hypercube) Let A = f0; 1gK : An alternative is represented by a se-
quence a =
 
a1; :::; aK

with ak 2 f0; 1g : For all k; let Hk0 := fa : ak = 0g and Hk1 :=
4Note that the set A can be recovered from an attribute space H since A = S
H2H
H:
5
fa : ak = 1g and consider the family H of all such subsets. The induced hypercube be-
tweenness is given, for all a; b; c 2 A; by b 2 [a; c] :, for all k : ak = ck ) bk = ak = ck :
Geometrically, b is between a and c if and only if b is contained in the subcube spanned by
a and c:
Example 3 (Cycles) Let A = fa1; :::; akg and consider the k-cycle on A; i.e. the graph
with the edges (al; al+1) with the convention al+k = al: If k is odd, dene H as the family
of sets of the form
n
al; :::; al 1+ k1
2
o
: If k is even, dene H as the family of sets of the
form
n
al; :::; al 1+ k
2
o
:
A subset S  A is convex if it is the intersection of attributes. By convention \; = A,
hence A is also convex. For all B  A, the convex hull of B; denoted by Co (B) is the
smallest convex set that contains it. For all a; b 2 A; the segment [a; b] is the convex hull
of fa; bg. The elements of [a; b] are exactly the alternatives that are between a and b:
A binary relation Ri is called a preference if it is reexive, transitive and complete,
i.e. a weak ordering.5 Let Pi and Ii be the associated strict preference and indi¤erence
relation. Let H be an attribute space. A preference Ri is adapted to H if there exists
p (Ri) 2 A such that for all a 6= b 2 A; a 2 [p (Ri) ; b] ) a Pi b: This means that p (Ri) is
the single peakof preference Ri, i.e. its most preferred alternative. Moreover if a has
more attributes (in an inclusion sense) in common with p (Ri) than b; then preference Ri
prefers a to b:
Let R be the set of preferences, which are adapted to H: In this paper, we focus on
domains of preferences, which are adapted to some attribute space:
The line attribute space in Example 1 generates a discrete version of the classic single-
peaked domain on a line studied by Moulin (1980), Thomson (1993) and Ching and Thom-
son (1997). The tree attribute space in Example 1 generates a discrete version of the
domain of single-peaked preferences on a tree studied by Ching and Thomson (1997),
Vohra (1999), Klaus (1999, 2001) and Schummer and Vohra (2002). The attribute space in
5Nehring and Puppe work with linear orderings (2007a,b). Here we consider weak orderings. Either
domain is rich enough for our results to hold.
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Example 2 generates the separable domain over subsets of objects, introduced by Barberà,
Sonnenschein and Zhou (1991). The attribute space in Example 3 generates a discrete
version of the domain of single-peaked preferences on a circle studied by Gordon (2007a)
and Schummer and Vohra (2002). The unrestricted domain, the domain of separable and
single-peaked domains on product of lines are also special cases.
We consider problems with a xed population and problems with a variable population.
For each, we dene a relevant solidarity condition.
Fixed population. Let N be a xed nonempty nite set of agents with generic agent
denoted by i: A xed population problem is dened by an attribute space H and a xed
population N: Each agent i is equipped with a preference Ri 2 R: A preference prole is a
list RN = (Ri)i2N 2 RN : A rule is a mapping f : RN ! A: We are interested in solutions
such that when the preference of one agent changes, the other agents are all a¤ected in the
same direction: either they all weakly win or the all weakly lose.
Replacement-domination. For all RN 2 RN ; all i 2 N; all R0i 2 R; either for all j 2 N nfig ;
f
 
R0i; RNnfig

Rj f (RN ) ; or for all j 2 N n fig, f (RN ) Rj f
 
R0i; RNnfig

:
We assume that jN j  3; which is the minimal cardinality for which replacement-
domination has bite.
Variable population. Let N be a nite set of potential agents with generic agent de-
noted by i: A variable population problem is dened by an attribute space H and a set of
potential agents N : It consists of the collection of problems with xed population (H; N)
for all nonempty N  N . A preference prole is given by a set N and a list RN 2 RN :
A (variable population) rule is a mapping f : [NRN ! A: For all N  N nite, the
restriction of f to RN is denoted by fN :We are interested in solutions such that when one
agent joins the economy and the preferences of the agents already present in the economy
are kept xed, these agents who were present before the change are all a¤ected in the same
direction: either they all weakly win or they all weakly lose.
Population-monotonicity. For all N  N ; RN 2 RN ; all i 2 N nN; all R0i 2 R; either for
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all j 2 N; f (R0i; RN ) Rj f (RN ) ; or for all j 2 N; f (RN ) Rj f (R0i; RN ) :
We assume that jN j  3; which is the minimal cardinality for which population-
monotonicity has bite.
In each of these models, we study the compatibility of these conditions with the fol-
lowing additional requirements. A xed population rule satises voter-sovereignty if it is
onto, i.e. if every alternative is selected by the rule for some prole in its domain. Next, a
rule is strategy-proof if revealing their true preferences is a weakly dominant strategy for
all agents: for all RN 2 RN , all i 2 N and all R0i 2 R, we have f (RN ) Ri f
 
R0i; RNnfig

:
Last, a rule satises Pareto-e¢ ciency, if at any prole, there is no alternative that is weakly
preferred by all agents in the economy and strictly preferred by at least one agent to the al-
ternative selected by the choice function: for all RN 2 RN , there exists no a 2 A such that
for all i 2 N; a Ri f (RN ) and for some j 2 N , a Pj f (RN ) : A variable population rule f
satises either of these three properties if for all N; the restriction fN satises it. We are in-
terested in rules that satisfy solidarity and either voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness,
or Pareto-e¢ ciency.
3 Voting by issues
In this Section, we present a classic result in the literature, on which our results are based.
It characterizes the class of rules that satisfy voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness as
voting by issues.The results in this section were obtained by Nehring and Puppe (2007b)
in the attribute-based framework. Similar results were previously obtained by Barberà,
Massó and Neme (1997, 2005) in the related model of voting under constraints.
An issue is dened as the pair formed by an attribute and its complement. Under
voting by issues, the agents vote separately on each issue, over the two corresponding
competing attributes, using an issue-specic voting rule for each of the issues. The alter-
native that is selected is the one that possesses all of the adopted attributes. Of course,
such a procedure is well dened only if the issue-specic voting rules satisfy certain joint
restrictions.
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More precisely, consider a xed population problem (H; N). A family of winning coali-
tions is a non-empty family W of subsets of N satisfying [W 2 W and W W 0]) W 0 2
W: For example, for any q 2 (0; 1) ; the quota q family consists of the coalitions W  N
such that jW j > q jN j : A structure of winning coalitions is a list (WH)H2H of families of
winning coalitions indexed by the attributes of H such that for each W  N and each
attribute H; we have
W 2 WH , N nW =2 WHc : (1)
Let W = (WH)H2H be a structure of winning coalitions. Voting by issues associated
with W is the rule f : RN ! A such that for all RN 2 RN ;
a = f (RN ) :, for all H 2 H such that a 2 H we have fi : p (Ri) 2 Hg 2 WH :
In general, the rule f need not be well-dened.6 Nehring and Puppe (2007b) provide the
following important characterization.
Proposition 1 (Nehring and Puppe, 2007b) A rule f satises voter-sovereignty and
strategy-proofness if and only if it is voting by issues and well-dened.
Obviously, this result extends to variable population problems in the following way.
Corollary 1 A variable population rule satises voter-sovereignty and strategy-proofness
if for each nonempty N  N ; the rule fN is voting by issues and well-dened.
An important feature of voting by issues is that the rules in this class always selects
an alternative that lies in the convex hull of the peaks of the agents: for all RN 2 RN ;
f (RN ) 2 Co (fp (Ri) : i 2 Ng) : In particular, for all preference prole with exactly two
distinct peaks, the choice function selects an alternative that lies between the two peaks: for
all RN such that there is a 6= b 2 A such that fp (Ri)gi2N = fa; bg ; we have f (RN ) 2 [a; b] :
6Nehring and Puppe (2007b) provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition on the structure of winning
coalitions under which voting by issues is well-dened: the intersection property. Barberà, Massó and
Neme (1997) provide a di¤erent necessary and su¢ cient condition, also labelled intersection property
under which separable voting under constraints is well-dened.
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4 Strategy-proofness and Solidarity
In this section, we study the compatibility of voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and
either solidarity conditions.
In the last section, we introduced voting by issues. A rule in this class is a unanimity
rule if there exists a targetba 2 A whose attributes can only be defeated by unanimity,
i.e. such thatWH = 2N nf;g for all H such that ba 2 H andWH = fNg for all H such thatba =2 H: Such a rule is denoted by fba: As Nehring and Puppe (2005) note, it follows directly
from this denition that for any RN 2 RN ; fba (RN ) is well-dened if and only if there
exists an alternative that is both in Co (fp (R1) ; :::; p (Rn)g) and in [ba; p (Ri)] for all i 2 N:
If there is such an alternative, it is necessarily unique and it is precisely fba (RN ). The
condition fba (RN ) 2 Co (fp (R1) ; :::; p (Rn)g) expresses the fact that any attribute that is
unanimously supported gets approved. The condition fba (RN ) 2 [ba; p (Ri)] expresses the
fact that any attribute possessed by ba and supported by at least one agent gets approved.
Similarly, in a variable population model, a rule f is a variable-population unanimity rule
if there exists ba 2 A; such that for all N; the restriction fN is the unanimity rule fba:
We now show that unanimity rules are the only rules that satisfy voter-sovereignty,
strategy-proofness and the relevant solidarity condition both with a xed and a variable
population.
Proposition 2 (i) A rule f satises voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and replacement-
domination if and only if it is a unanimity rule. (ii) A variable-population rule f satises
voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity if and only if it is a una-
nimity rule.
Proof. It is clear that a unanimity rule satises the conditions. We prove the converse
implications.
(i) From Proposition 1, we know that f is voting by issues and well-dened, character-
ized by a winning coalition structure (WH)H :
First, we show that for all H 2 H; either WH = 2N n f;g or WH = fNg : Suppose
by contradiction that this is not the case. Then let H 2 H, W 2 WH and i 2 W;
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such that W 6= N and W n fig 6= ; and W n fig =2 WH : Let a 2 H and b =2 H: Let
Ra 2 R be a preference such that p (Ra) = a and for all x 2 H and all y =2 H; x P a y:
Similarly, let Rb 2 R be such that p  Rb = b and for all x =2 H and all y 2 H; x P b
y: Let RN 2 RN such that for all j 2 W; Rj := Ra and for all j 2 N nW; Rj := Rb:
Next, let R0i := R
b: By denition of voting by issues, this implies that f (RN ) 2 H but
f
 
R0i; RNnfig

=2 H: Therefore the replacement of Ri by R0i hurts all agents in W n fig
and benets all agents in N nW; which contradicts replacement-domination. Thus, for all
H 2 H; either WH = 2N n f;g or WH = fNg :
Next, letHf :=

H 2 H :WH = 2N n f;g
	
:We now show that
T
H2Hf H 6= ;. Suppose
by contradiction that this set is empty. Then there is H1; :::;Hl 2 Hf ; where l > 2; such
that
Tl 1
k=1Hk 6= ; and
Tl
k=1Hk = ;: Let Let Ra; Rb 2 R be such that p (Ra) 2
Tl 1
k=1Hk
and p (Rb) 2 Hl: Let R be the prole (Ra; Rb; :::; Rb) where Rb is repeated jN j   1 times.
Since all the Hk for k = 1; :::; l are in Hf ; we have f (R) 2
Tl
k=1Hk = ;; which is a
contradiction. Therefore
T
H2Hf H 6= ;:
Last, we show that this intersection has exactly one element ba: Suppose that a 6= b 2T
H2Hf H: Let H 2 H such that a 2 H and b =2 H: If H 2 Hf ; then b 2
T
H2Hf H is
contradicted. If instead H =2 Hf ; then by (1), Hc 2 Hf and a 2
T
H2Hf H is contradicted.
Therefore there is ba 2 A such that ba = TH2Hf H: Moreover, for all RN 2 RN ; we have
f (RN ) 2 Co (p (Ri) : i 2 N) and f (RN ) 2 [f (Ri) ;ba] for all i 2 N: Therefore f is a
unanimity rule with parameter ba.
(ii) First, we show that for each H 2 H; each population N  N with jN j  3; each
W  N such that jW j  2; and each i 2W; we have W 2 WH;N =) W nfig 2 WH;Nnfig:
Let H;N;W and i satisfy these conditions and suppose that W 2 WH;N : Let a 2 H and
b =2 H: Let Ra 2 R be a preference such that p (Ra) = a and for all x 2 H and all
y =2 H; x P a y: Similarly, let Rb 2 R be such that p  Rb = b and for all x =2 H and all
y 2 H; x P b y: Let RN 2 RN such that for all j 2 W; Rj := Ra and for all j 2 N nW;
Rj := R
b: By denition of voting by issues, since W 2 WH;N ; we have f (RN ) 2 H: Next,
consider the prole RNnfig; where agent i has left: By population-monotonicity, we have
f
 
RNnfig
 2 H: By denition of voting by issues, this implies that W n fig 2 WH;Nnfig:
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Second, we show that for each H 2 H; each population N  N with jN j  2; each
W  N such that jW j  1; and each i =2 N; we have W 2 WH;N =) W 2 WH;N[fig:
Let H;N;W and i satisfy these conditions and suppose that W 2 WH;N : Let a 2 H and
b =2 H: Let Ra 2 R be a preference such that p (Ra) = a and for all x 2 H and all y =2 H;
x P a y: Similarly, let Rb 2 R be such that p  Rb = b and for all x =2 H and all y 2 H; x
P b y: Let RN 2 RN such that for all j 2W; Rj := Ra and for all j 2 N nW; Rj := Rb: By
denition of voting by issues, we have f (RN ) 2 H: Next, consider the prole (R0i; RN ) ;
where agent i is added, with the preference R0i := R
b: By population-monotonicity, we have
f (R0i; RN ) 2 H: By denition of voting by issues, this implies that W 2 WH;N[fig:
The implication proved in last paragraph, together with the implication for all H;N;W;
[W 2 WN;H and W W 0] ) W 0 2 WN;H implies that for all H; either WH;N = 2N n f;g
for all N or WH;N = fNg for all N:
Last, we dene the family Hf :=

H 2 H :WH = 2N n f;g
	
; which as we saw does
not depend on N; and ba = TH2Hf H exactly like in (i) : Thus for all N; the rule fN is the
unanimity rule with parameter ba:
For all (a; b; c) 2 A; if the set [a; b] \ [b; c] \ [a; c] is not empty, it necessarily contains a
single element called the median of (a; b; c) ; denoted by med (a; b; c) : An alternative a 2 A
is called a median alternative for H if and only if for all b; c 2 A the triple (a; b; c) has a
median: Nehring and Puppe (2005, 2010) obtained the following result.
Proposition 3 (Nehring and Puppe 2005, 2010) For all ba 2 A; and all N such that
jN j  2; the unanimity rule fba is well-dened on RN ; if and only if ba is a median alternative
for H.
It is easy to see that the direct implication is true. If fba is well-dened at some prole
with peaks located at b and c; it is necessarily a median of ba, b and c: The fact that when ba
is a median point, the rule fba is well-dened is less clear. Nehring and Puppe (2005, 2010)
provide an abstract proof of this fact. For completeness, we provide here a constructive
proof of this result, which we believe is more transparent.
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Proof. First, suppose that the rule fba is well-dened on RN ; with jN j  2: Let b; c be
arbitrary alternatives in A: Consider a prole RN such that all agents have their peaks in
fb; cg and not all agents have the same peak: Then by denition, fba (RN ) is an element of
[ba; b] \ [ba; c] \ [b; c] : Therefore this set is not empty. Since this is true for all b; c 2 A; thenba is a median alternative.
Conversely, suppose that ba is a median alternative. Let jN j  2: Without loss of
generality, let 1; :::; n be the agents in N: Dene the sequence x1 := p1 and for all i 2
f2; :::; ng ; let xi := med (ba; xi 1; pi) : Since ba is a median point, the sequence is well-dened.
By construction, xn 2 Co (fxn 1; png)  Co (fxn 2; pn 1; png)  :::  Co (fx1; :::; pkg) :
Again by construction, we know that xn 2 [ba; pn]; xn 2 [ba; xn 1]  [ba; pn 1] ; ... and
xn 2 [ba; xn 1]  :::  [ba; x2]  [ba; p1] : Therefore xn is an element in Co (fx1; :::; pkg) that is
in the interval [ba; pi] for all i = 1; :::; n: Therefore fba (RN ) is well-dened and fba (RN ) = xn:
Since this construction is feasible for all RN 2 RN ; the rule fba is well-dened.
An attribute space is called quasi-median (Nehring 2004) if it contains at least one
median alternative and it is called median if all alternatives in A are median. From
these denitions and Proposition 3, it follows that the attribute-structures that admit a
unanimity rule are exactly the quasi-median spaces. From this observation and Proposition
2, we obtain the following characterization.
Corollary 2 The following three statements are equivalent.
(i) The attribute space H admits a rule that satises voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness
and replacement-domination.
(ii) The attribute space H admits a variable population rule that satises voter-sovereignty,
strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity.
(iii) H is quasi-median.
Nehring and Puppe (2005) provide several interesting characterizations of quasi-median
spaces. We end this section by two examples of such spaces, whose associated domains are
not discrete counterparts of the domains considered by Klaus (1999, 2001).
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Example 4 A subset of at most L out of K public projects, with 1  L < K; has to be
selected. An alternative species which of the projects will be carried out. Attributes are the
sets of alternatives of the form yes to project kand no to project kfor all k = 1; :::;K:
This attribute space has exactly K + 1 median alternatives. These are all the alternatives
of the formonly project k is carried out for all k = 1; :::;K and no project is carried
out. Consequently, exactly K + 1 rules satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2. In any
rule in this class, each of the projects, except perhaps one, require unanimous support for
approval. If a project does not require unanimous support for approval, a single vote in its
favour su¢ ces to get it approved.
Example 5 Let A := fa; b; c; d; eg : The attributes are the sets fa; b; cg ; fb; c; dg ; fc; d; eg ;
fa; eg ; fa; bg and fd; eg : This attribute space has two median points b and d: Therefore the
two rules that satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2 are the unanimity rules with parameter
either b or d:
5 Pareto-e¢ ciency and Solidarity
In this section, we study the compatibility of Pareto-e¢ ciency and either solidarity con-
ditions. Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999, 2001) have shown
that Pareto-e¢ ciency is compatible with either replacement-domination or population-
monotonicity on domains of single-peaked preferences dened on trees.7 Both the set of
alternatives and the preference domain these authors consider are continua. Their discrete
counterpart in our setting is the class of domains of single-peaked preferences on discrete
trees, such as the ones presented in Example 1.
In the light of the results by Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra (1999) and Klaus
(1999, 2001), it is natural to ask the following question: Are these properties compatible
in other attribute-based preferences domains? Unfortunately, we nd that the answer to
this question is negative: tree structures are the only attribute-based domains on which
7Other properties are studied on these domains by Demange (1982) and Danilov (1994) and Schummer
and Vohra (2002).
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Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity properties are compatible.
To establish this result, we rst provide an abstract characterization of the attribute
spaces that generate domains in the class presented in Example 1. It is well known and
easily veried that the attribute spaces H constructed in Example 1 are median and in
addition satisfy the following condition.
Condition (T ) : For all H;H 0 2 H; at least one of the sets H \ H 0; H \ H 0c; Hc \ H 0;
Hc \H 0c is empty.
Conversely, we establish that these two conditions, the median condition and (T ),
characterize tree structures, a result we believe is of independent interest.8 From any
median attribute space H that satises (T ) ; one can recover a discrete graph-theoretic
tree, that is a graph (a nite set of vertices and edges) that is connected (any two vertices
are connected through some path) and has no cycles.
Proposition 4 Let H be a median attribute space that satises (T ). Then the graph on
A =
S
H2H
H whose edges are the pairs (a; b) such that there exists a unique attribute Ha 2 H
such that a 2 Ha and b 2 Hca is a tree, i.e. it is connected and has no cycles.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let H be a tree attribute space.
Step 1: The graph dened in the Proposition is connected.
For any two alternatives a; b let a  b if [a; b] = fa; bg : We will show that (a; b) is an
edge if and only if a  b: Let a; b be alternatives such that a  b: Let H and H 0 be any
two attributes such that a 2 H \H 0 and b 2 Hc \H 0c: We need to prove that H = H 0: By
contradiction, suppose that this is not the case. For example H 0  H: Then there exists
c 2 H 0 nH: Then by condition (T ) it must be that either H  H 0: Moreover b and c are in
Hc and b is in H 0c: Then the median of a; b and c is an element of [a; b] ; but it is neither a
8Buneman (1971) and Bandelt and Dress (1986) provide related constructions, without assuming a
median space. Their construction, however, allows introducing latent alternatives, i.e. additional alter-
natives outisde of the set A in order to construct a tree consistent with an attribute structure that satises
(T ). Our result shows that when the space is median, latent alternatives are not needed. In addition, our
construction relies on elementary arguments.
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nor b; since it is an element of Hc (ruling out a) and it is also an element of H (ruling out
b). This contradicts that [a; b] = fa; bg : Therefore necessarily H = H 0; which proves that
(a; b) is an edge.
It follows immediately from the previous paragraph that the graph dened in the Propo-
sition is connected.
Step 2: Monotonicity of attributes along a path.
Let a and b be arbitrary alternatives. Consider a path a0; :::; an with a0 = a and an = b
connecting a and b: For all i; since (ai; ai+1) is an edge, there exists exactly one attribute,
let it be denoted Hi; such that ai 2 Hi and ai+1 =2 Hi: We will show that for all i; we have
Hi i  Hi: Since (ai 1; ai) form an edge, and ai 1 and ai are already separated by Hi 1
and Hci 1; then they are not separated by Hi and H
c
i : Since ai 2 Hi; then ai 1 2 Hi:
Similarly, since (ai; ai+1) form an edge, and ai and ai+1 are already separated by Hi
and Hci ; then they are not separated by Hi 1 and H
c
i 1: Since ai 2 Hci 1; then ai+1 2 Hci 1:
Thus Hi \ Hi 1 contains ai 1; Hi \ Hci 1 contains ai and Hci \ Hci 1 contains ai+1;
therefore (T ) implies that Hi 1  Hi: The inclusion is strict because ai 2 Hi \Hci 1:
Step 3: The graph does not contain any cycles. Suppose by contradiction that there
exists a path a0; :::; an with an = a0. By Step 2, we nd that H0  :::  Hn  H0; a
contradiction. We conclude that the graph does not contain any cycles, i.e. it is a tree in
a graph theoretic sense.
From now on, a tree attribute space is a median attribute space that satises (T ) :
We are now ready to show that Pareto-e¢ ciency and solidarity are only compatible on tree
attribute spaces. Note that we do not assume strategy-proofness, thus we cannot restrict
attention to voting by issues from the outset, as we did in the previous section.
Proposition 5 Let H be an attribute space. (i) Let jN j  3: Let f be a rule. If f satises
Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination, then H is a tree attribute space. (ii) Let
jN j  3: Let f be a variable-population rule. If f satises Pareto-e¢ ciency and population-
monotonicity, then H is a tree attribute space.
The idea of proof is the following. We associate to any rule satisfying the conditions a
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two agents rule, which turns out to be a Pareto-e¢ cient unanimity rule (Steps 1 and 2).
Then in Steps 3 and 4, we show that this implies that H is a tree.
Proof. Throughout the proof, let H be an attribute space.
(i) : Let jN j  3: Let f be a rule that satises Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-
domination.
Let M := f1; 2g and g : RM ! A; such that for all (R1; R2) 2 RM ; we have
g (R1; R2) := f (R
0
N ) ; where R
0
N 2 RN is such that R01 = R1 and R0i = R2; for all i  2:
Step 1: The rule g satises anonymity, strategy-proofness and Pareto-e¢ ciency.
First, it is obvious that the rule g satises Pareto-e¢ ciency.
Next, we prove that for all (R1; R2) ; we have g (R1; R2) Ii g (R2; R1) for all i 2 f1; 2g.
Let (R1; R2) 2 RM : Then g (R1; R2) = f (R0N ) ; where R0N 2 RN is such that R01 = R1
and R0i = R2; for all i  2:: Consider the transformation of R0N = (R1; R2; :::; R2) in R00N =
(R2; R1; :::; R1) where for each agent i 2 f3; :::; ng ; the preference R0i = R2 is replaced by
the preference R00i = R1 in decreasing index order. Then the preference R
0
1 = R1 is replaced
by the preference R001 = R2 and last the preference R02 = R2 is replaced by the preference
R002 = R1: At each step in the transformation, the Pareto-set for the preference subprole
of the agents whose preferences are kept xed is the same at the Pareto-set for the entire
proles (of any prole along the path). By Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination,
this implies that the preferences R1 and R2 remain indi¤erent between the images by f
along the path. Therefore g (R1; R2) = f (R1; R2; :::; R2) Ii f (R2; R1; :::; R1) = g (R2; R1) ;
for all i 2 f1; 2g.
Last, we prove that g satises strategy-proofness. By anonymity, it su¢ ces to prove
that for all (R1; R2) 2 RM and all R02 2 R; we have g (R1; R2) R2 g (R1; R02) : We have
g (R1; R2) = f (R1; R2; :::; R2) : Consider the sequence of transformations where the pref-
erence Ri = R2 is replace by the preference R0i = R
0
2; for each i 2 f2; :::; ng in increasing
order. When replacing the preference of an agent of indices in f3; :::; n  1g ; the image by
f remains unchanged by the same argument as in the last paragraph. In the rst replace-
ment, agent 2 cannot strictly benet, since this would imply agent 3 strictly benets, which
would imply that f
 
R02; RNnf2g

Pareto-dominates f (R1; R2; :::; R2) for (R1; R2) ; i.e. for
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RN : Similarly, in the last replacement, agent n cannot strictly benet. If this where the
case, since all agents 1; :::; n 1 are a¤ected in the same direction, these agents must weakly
lose (at least one of them strictly), otherwise f (R1; R02; :::; R02; R2) is not Pareto-e¢ cient for
(R1; R
0
2; :::; R
0
2; R2) : But this in turns contradicts the Pareto-e¢ ciency of f (R1; R
0
2; :::; R
0
2)
for (R1; R02; :::; R02) : Therefore agent n weakly loses. Last f (R1; R02; :::; R02) = g (R1; R02) :
In summary, we obtain that g (R1; R2) R2 g (R1; R02) ; i.e. g satises strategy-proofness.
Last, since g satises strategy-proofness and voter-sovereignty, it only depends on the
agentspeaks. Therefore, the property established in the second paragraph of Step 1 implies
that g satises anonymity.
Step 2: The rule g is a unanimity rule. Let ba be the unique alternative such that for
all (R1; R2) ; g (R1; R2) = med (ba; p (R1) ; p (R2)) :
Step 3: The attribute space H satises condition (T ) :9
Suppose by contradiction that H violates condition (T ) : If this is the case, then there
are alternatives a1; :::; a4 2 A and attributes H and H 0; such that a1 2 H \ H 0; a2 2
H \H 0c; a3 2 Hc \H 0c; and a4 2 Hc \H 0: Then ba is an element of exactly one of these
four sets. Suppose for example that ba 2 H \ H 0: Consider now a prole (R1; R2) such
that p (R1) = a2 and p (R2) = a4; and moreover for all a 2 H \ H 0; we have a3 P1 a
and a3 P2 a: Therefore none of the alternatives in H \ H 0 is Pareto-e¢ cient. However,
g (R1; R2) = med (ba; p (R1) ; p (R2)), which is an element of H \H 0, contradicting Pareto-
e¢ ciency. Therefore the attribute space H satises condition (T ) :
Step 4: The space H is a median space:
Suppose, by contradiction that H is not a median space. Then, we know from Nehring
and Puppe (2007b, Proposition 4.1) that there is a family of attributes H1; :::;Hk; with
k  3; such that Tkl=1Hl = ; and for each h 2 f1; :::; kg ; Tl 6=hHl 6= ;:For each h = 1; :::; k;
let aj 2
T
l 6=hHl: For each pair l; l
0; l 6= l0; the sets Hl \ Hl0 ; Hcl \ Hl0 and Hl \ Hcl0 are
non-empty. Therefore, by Step 3, it must be that, for each pair l; l0; l 6= l0; Hcl \Hcl0 = ;:
9Steps 3 and 4 in the proof can be deduced from the main result in Nehring and Puppe (2007a), more
precisely from Claim (a) in their Theorem. For the sake of completeness, we provide a direct proof that
exploits the special structure of this model to avoid the complexities of their analysis.
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Therefore any alternative a 2 A is an element of exactly k   1 sets Hl and one set Hl0 :
Without loss of generality, lets suppose that ba 2 H1\:::\Hk 1\Hck: Consider now a prole
(R1; R2) such that p (R1) = a1 and p (R2) = a2: Then g (R1; R2) = med (ba; p (R1) ; p (R2)) ;
which is an element of [p (R1) ; p (R2)] 
Tk
l=3Hl; of [ba; p (R1)]  H2 and of [ba; p (R2)]  H1:
Since
Tk
l=1Hl = ;; this is a contradiction. Therefore H is a median space:
Therefore H is a tree attribute space.
(ii) : The proof follows exactly the same steps, therefore we only provide a sketch. Let
jN j  3: Let f be a variable-population rule that satises Pareto-e¢ ciency and population-
monotonicity. Let g be the restriction of f to RM with M := f1; 2g : Each preference
replacement in the proof of (i) is achieved in two steps by rst withdrawing the agent
whose preference is replaced and then adding him back with the new preference. At the
end, all agents with labels other than 1 and 2 are removed. The remaining steps are
identical to those in (i).
To end this section, we provide the discrete counterparts of the characterizations ob-
tained by Ching and Thomson (1997), Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999, 2001) on trees.10
Our proof di¤ers from theirs, as it relies on the theory of voting by issues and does not
require an innite set of alternatives.
Proposition 6 Let H be a tree attribute space. (i) Let jN j  3: Let f be a rule. Then f
satises Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination if and only if f is a unanimity rule.
(ii) Let jN j  3: Let f be a variable population rule. Then f satises Pareto-e¢ ciency
and population-monotonicity if and only if f is a unanimity rule.
Proof. It is clear that a unanimity rules satises the conditions. We prove the converse
implication. Throughout the proof, let H be a tree.
(i) : Let jN j  3: Let f be a rule that satises Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-
domination. Let M := f1; 2g and g : RM ! A; such that for all (R1; R2) 2 RM ; we
have g (R1; R2) := f (R0N ) ; where R
0
N 2 RN is such that R01 = R1 and R0i = R2; for all
10The proofs in Vohra (1999) and Klaus (1999, 2001) require innitely many alternatives. This assumption
is implicitly used, for example, in Vohras Lemma 3.
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i  2: From Step 1 in the proof of Proposition 5, we know that g satises Pareto-e¢ ciency
and strategy-proofness and that it is a unanimity rule with status quo ba: Let fba be the
unanimity rule with status quo ba on RN . We will prove here that f = fba:
Let RN 2 RN : Let a := fba (RN ) and b := f (RN ) : Since a and b are in the
Pareto-set for RN ; there are two distinct agents i; j 2 N such that a 2 [p (Ri) ; p (Rj)]
and b 2 [p (Ri) ; p (Rj)] : We will transform the prole RN into the prole R0N such that
R01 = Ri and R02 = ::: = R0n = Rj :
Step 1. First, let L := N nfi; jg : Let R0l := Rj : Replace one by one the preference Rl of
each agent l 2 L by R0l := R2: Once this is done, we obtain the prole R0N such that R0i = Ri
and R0l = Rj for all l 6= i: If i = 1; the transformation ends here. If not, then 1 6= i; so that
R01 = Rj : In this case, let R001 := Ri and R00i := Rj : Replace rst the preference R
0
1 = Rj by
R001 = Ri and then the preference R0i = R1 by the preference R
00
i = R2: The transformation
ends and we obtain the prole R00N such that R
00
1 = Ri and R
00
2 = ::: = R
00
n = Rj : At
each elementary step in this transformation, there are always at least two agents whose
preferences are kept xed and are Ri and Rj :We will show that the image by f remains b
along the path. Along the path, the set of preferences represented in the prole decreases
or remains constant at each step. By Pareto-e¢ ciency and replacement-domination, this
implies that the change weakly benets preferences Ri and Rj . Since this is true at each
step, and by transitivity, it must be that f (R00N ) Ri f (RN ) and f (R
00
N ) Rj f (RN ) : But
since f (RN ) = b 2 [p (Ri) ; p (Rj)] ; this implies that f (R00N ) = b:
But f (R00N ) = g (R
00
1 ; R
00
2) = g (Ri; Rj) = med (ba; p (Ri) ; p (Rj)) : By denition of a;
we know that a 2 [a; p (Rj)] \ [a; p (Ri)] : By denition of i and j, we know that a 2
[p (Ri) ; p (Rj)] : Therefore med (ba; p (Ri) ; p (Rj)) = a; i.e. f (RN ) = fba (RN ) : Since this
is true for all RN 2 RN ; we conclude that f is the unanimity rule with status quo ba:
(ii) The proof follows exactly the same steps, therefore we only provide a sketch. In
this case the rule g is the restriction of the variable-population rule f to Rf1;2g: Each
preference replacement in the proof of (i) is achieved in two steps by rst withdrawing
the agent whose preference is replaced and then adding him back with the new preference.
Last all agents with labels other than 1 and 2 are removed.
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Vohra (1999) and Klaus (2001) both point out that their characterization on trees is
valid even in the subdomain of symmetric preferences. This is not the case in the discrete
setting, as shown in the following example.
Example 6 Let A := f0; 1; xg ; with x  2: Consider the domain of preferences represented
by the utility functions u0 (a) =   jaj ; u1 (a) =   ja  1j and ux (a) =   ja  xj for all a 2
A: Then the rule, which for any preference prole maximizes the linear ordering x  0  1
on the set of Pareto-e¢ cient alternatives satises the conditions of Proposition 6 and is
not the restriction to this domain of any voting by issues rule.
We end this section by discussing the relation between the results by Gordon (2007a)
and the ones in this paper. Gordon (2007a) considers a general variable population
public choice problem, without assumptions on the preference domain, other than sym-
metry (all agents have the same set of possible preferences) and that the set of alter-
natives does not depend on the population. In this very general framework, Gordon
(2007a) does not provide a characterization, but establishes that under Pareto-e¢ ciency,
both population-monotonicity the one hand, and replacement-domination together with
replication-indi¤erence (the decision change that follows the cloning replication of the en-
tire population leaves all agents indi¤erent) have the following strong implications. First,
either combination implies strategy-proofness and even the stronger requirement of group-
strategy-proofness (no group of agents can jointly benet from misrepresenting the prefer-
ences of its members). Second, they imply anonymity (up to Pareto-indi¤erence). Third,
they imply that there is a status-quo alternativethat is always Pareto-dominated by the
choice of the rule. These results are obtained under the assumption that the population is
variable and that the set N is innite.11
In contrast, we do not assume that such an innite variable population is available and
focus on a more restricted class of models. Our results conrm that, in this more specic
11 In a similarly general framework, Bu (2013) establishes a general equivalence between false-name-
proofness, which requires non-manipulability via the creation of ctitious identities, and strategy-proofness,
anonymity and population-monotonicity. It would be interesting to study the implications of false-name-
proofness in the class of attribute-based preference domains.
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context, the above implications remain true as long as the xed population has at least three
agents in the xed population model, or as long as there are at least three potential agents
in the variable population model, and without the assumption of replication-indi¤erence.
The status quo alternative of a unanimity rule on a tree is its target ba: Moreover, both
anonymity and the existence of a status quo alternative are also shown to be implications
of the weaker conditions of voter-sovereignty, strategy-proofness and solidarity.
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